The View from the Right

Eighty years ago, the guns fell silent on the killing fields of France and Belgium. The seemingly pointless slaughter of millions and the defeat of Imperial Germany initiated the growth of revolutionary movements, including both Fascism and Marxism-Leninism, and propelled them on the road to power. The break-up of great empires permitted small nations to declare their independence and others to proclaim their right to national self-determination. At this point in twentieth century history, it can be argued, Zionism began its long political and indeed military struggle to secure an independent Jewish state.

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration proclaimed that there should be a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This was, of course, a very different entity from Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel. The Former connoted the present, a Jewish nation- state, a break with the past, a modern secular institution, a product of Zionist endeavor; the latter conjured up biblical imagery, the golden chain of Jewish tradition, a multi-layered concept that went far beyond mere sticks and stones. Indeed, Agudat Yismel was established in 1912 as an essentially religious anti— Zionist body to accentuate the difference between these concepts: if a state did arise, then it would not be a Jewish state, but simply an earthly state governed by Jews instead of non-Jews. The true Israel would arise with the coming of the Messiah.1
Did Eretz Yisrael have defined geographical boundaries? The traditional approach was the promise given by God to Abraham: “To your seed I have given this Land from the River of Egypt to the Great River, the River Euphrates.” 2 But this is clearly different from the geographical limits of Canaan at the time of the sons of Noah. The boundaries as determined in biblical sources are not static and reflect the extent of Israelite settlement at different times in Jewish history. The inheritance promised in Numbers 3 and Deuteronomy 4 to the children of Israel in their wanderings in the desert differs from the promise given to Joshua 5 when they were on the brink of entering the land. In Judges 6 it is clear that some Canaanite cities remained unconquered. In Ezekiel 7 at the time of the fall of Jerusalem and the Babylonia exile, the borders differ from those later cited in the Second Temple period of Ezra and Nehemiah. There is therefore a dialectic between the divine promise made to Abraham and its realisation by his descendants. There is a distinction between “the Promised Land” and Eretz Israel defined by the limits of Israelite settlement.
There are several historical definitions of the borders of the Land. The one articulated after the return from Babylon essentially delineates Hasmonean conquest during the Second Temple period. This coincides with the extent of settlement during the Mishnaic period, which in turn defines halakhic jurisdiction in questions of the mitzvot dependent on the Land.” 8 The broadest and perhaps most popular designation, “from Dan to Beersheva,” refers to a general description of the Land and suggests the source of the Jordan in the north to the perimeter of continuous settlement in the south? 9 Eretz Israel as a term is first mentioned only when a Jewish kingdom was actually in existence. 10 Previously, other labels existed such as Eretz Ha ’ivrim, 11 the Land of the Hebrews, and Eretz Bnei Yisrael, 12 the Land of the Children of Israel.
All these border, which certainly have geopolitical characteristics, became transmuted, probably in Mishnaic times, into boundaries which separated the holy from the profane. This became especially pronounced when sovereignty was lost.
In Mishna Gittin, 13 for example, in connection with the bringing of a get [a bill of divorcement] from a husband in foreign parts, Rabbi Yehuda defines “abroad” as beyond Rekem in the east, Ashkelon in the south, and Acco to the north. All three towns were considered to be “like” the areas outside Eretz Israel, which implies that they were indeed outside it. In the same section, Rabbi Meir rules that in matters of the get, Acco “counts” as part of Eretz Israel. 14 Since Rekem is designated in the Bible 15 as being situated within western Eretz Israel, Tosafot 16 reasons that this must be another town called Rekem outside the eastern border of the Land.
Nachal mitzrayim, the brook of Egypt in the Book of Number 17 (unlike the nahar mitzrayim of Genesis 18), was considered to be the Wadi El Arish, south of Gaza, by Saadia Gaon.” Nachal mitzrayim, however, is referred to as Shichor, a tributary of the Nile, elsewhere in the Bible. 20 Richard Sarason has suggested that there are two taxonomies in operation, “one implicating the People Israel and the other its Land. When these are not in harmony with each other, conflicts necessarily develop.”21
If there was a broad disparity in religious texts, how did the early Zionists contemplate the geographical boundaries of the promised Jewish homeland? The Encyclopedia Britannica of 1910/1911 comments that, although the River Jordan
naturally divides the area, “it is practically impossible to say where Palestine ends and the Arabian desert begins.” 22 The Balfour Declaration itself did not delineate specific borders, but it did for the first time concentrate Zionist minds as to the territorial location of the future Jewish State. 23
By February 1919, the World Zionist Organization had for the first time publicly enunciated the borders of the Jewish homeland in a proposal to the Versailles Conference. In the North, the new Jewish entity went up to the Litani River and Sidon in Southern Lebanon and included all sources of the River Jordan. In the East, it followed the Hejaz railway, but specifically did not envelop Damascus or Amman. In the South, it went down to Akaba and included Gaza. The final southern border was to be negotiated with the Egyptian government. 24
What determined these claims? The memorandum to the Versailles conference suggested that control of water sources was important in setting the northern border. In the East, it was a question of agricultural areas, the Dead Sea quarries, and access to the railway. In the South, it was an outlet to the Red Sea and the potential farmland of northern Sinai. All the borders also reflected the natural boundaries of the area, with the exception of the area around Damascus. 25
Here, the political consideration of Britain and France took precedence. Significantly, in 1920 the Zionists abandoned settlements on the Golan Heights and in the Bashan, which was now situated within the territory of the French Mandate, and they hardly protested when Zionist claims to Tyre were overruled by the British.
At the San Remo conference in April I920, the imperial powers, Britain and France, agreed to the limits of the norther border. At the Cairo conference in March 1921, Winston Churchill’s White Paper offered Transjordan to the Emir Abdullah. Abdullah had filled the power vacuum in the no-man’s land that was Transjordan, even though his central desire was to retake Damascus from the French. For Abdullah, Transjordan was initially a staging post along the way to greater things, which would come about with the help of the British and more clandestinely with the assistance of the Zionists and their connections. The
emergence of Abdullah’s kingdom constituted nearly forty percent of the territory demanded by the Zionists of Versailles. 26
The Twelfth Zionist Congress, which was held in Carlsbad in September 1921, expressed disquiet at the proposal to give the East Bank to Abdullah. Despite the sense of British back-trading, the Zionist movement was powerless to resist in any meaningful fashion. The Churchill memorandum, in June 1922, reflected a cooling of British ardour for the Zionist experiment and an evenhanded approach to the nationalist aspirations of both the Jews and the Palestine Arabs. The British were clear in condemning such phrases as “Palestine would become as Jewish as England is English” and dismissed the idea that a
Jewish national home would spread over the whole of Palestine. Together with other Zionist leaders, Vladimir Jabotinsky acquiesced in this policy in order that the Mandate for Palestine should be formally ratified. 27
Even so, nagging misgivings about this first partition of mandatory Palestine, the apparent soft-pedalling of the Zionist movement, its distancing from perceived Herzlian ideals, 28 and an increasing opposition to British policy prompted ]abotinsky’s resignation from the Zionist executive in January 1923. By the end of the year, the youth group, Betar, had been established in Riga, and within two years Jabotinsky had founded the Union of Zionist Revisionists, the forerunner of today’s Likud. 29
Jabotinsky, the founder of the Jewish Legion, was seen as the leading advocate for a militant Zionism embellished by military prowess. 30 His dislike of political compromise avoided the acknowledgment of private doubt and the dilution of fundamental truths. During the breakthrough period, 31 ideological zealotry was called for. No “ideological sha’atnez” 32—-no mixing of ideologies such as socialism and Zionism-—could be permitted, as this would serve to weaken the national struggle. A Jewish State was the primary goal.
The complexities of a difficult situation and the necessary falseness of the diplomatic process contrasted starkly with Jabotinsky’s focus on idealism and self-reliance. His anti-establishmentarianism, an ongoing defiance of the Zionist leadership, a proud nationalism, and a celebration of military endeavor — all vividly illustrated by his spellbinding oratory—were a great attraction to Jewish youth in the 1930s. “Brit Trumpeldor [Betar],” Jabotinsky wrote, “seeks to do away with the ‘sha’atnez of the soul.”33
The task of achieving the ]ewish State “in our generation” would be the task in part of a strong, committed Jewish youth movement. Jabotinsky believed that the studied lack of urgency and a “shallow conception of Zionism” had a debilitating effect on Jewish youth. He complained that the youth were being spoon-fed “a grotesque Ahad Ha’amism” and that liberal figures such as Martin Buber were causing considerable damage? 34
Ahad Ha’am himself complained bitterly to me and to others that his teaching had been distorted, for he had always favoured the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine….To them is babbled the doctrine of Martin Buber, a typical provincial in outlook, a third-rate would-be thinker, with nine parts twisted phrases to one part ideas, and these neither his own nor of value. The youth is taught to regard Zionism as a dream and that it is desirable for it to remain a dream, never to become a reality. 35
His young acolytes proved astute pupils and became far more radical than Jabotinsky himself. 36 Despite himself, their mentor was the archetypal fin de siecle jewish intellectual: cosmopolitan where they were often insular, assimilationist in inclination where they were often children of the shtetl, a relativist where they were dogmatists, a secularist who approached Judaism like music—a matter of taste rather than belief, a writer who felt as much at home with the delights of Italian culture as with the world of Yiddish homilies, a nineteenth-century liberal democrat whose thought had been fashioned by the plight of East European Jewry and the carnage of the First World War. Jabotinsky’s elevation of individualism, his emphasis on ritual symbols and discipline, and his support for economic corporativism coloured the outlook of his young followers. The words of the rousing Betar anthem promoted the idea that even the poorest Jew was a prince, the bearer of the crown of King David. 37
Ritual and ceremony formed an important part of Betar’s raison d’étre —  a behavioural veneer which characterised Menachem Begin and many of his contemporaries throughout their lives. At the Third World Conference of Betar in Warsaw in September 1938, Jabotinsky told his audience that ritual demonstrates man’s superiority over beast:
What is the difference between a civilised man and a wild man? Ceremony. Everything in the world is ritual. A court trial—ceremony. How else is a case conducted in court? The judge opens the session and gives the floor to the prosecutor; then to the counsel for defense….It may be that the most important of all the new ideas which Betar given to the Jewish ghetto, is the idea of ceremony. The special uniform seemed strange to the Jewish public fifteen years ago. And so did all our other habits—standing upright, walking straight, and so on. 38
The authoritarian tendencies, which Jabotinsky absorbed from the growth of the far right in Europe, were transmitted to and enthusiastically received in Betar— and its radical posture provided Jabotinsky with a political counterweight to the
more staid approach of the executive of the Revisionist movement. 39
The Labour Zionist movement and its Revisionist opponents were in bitter conflict with each other in an age of ideology. 40 Naturally, one area of fundamental disagreement was the willingness of David Ben-Gurion and his allies to compromise, to be flexible on the question of the borders to attain a Jewish homeland. Of the many bones of contention, the left also resented Betar’s embrace of Jewish tradition under Jabotinsky’s direction. Jabotinsky believed that it fortified Jewish identity and enhanced identification with the national struggle through an understanding of Jewish history and religious culture.
Ironically, Jabotinsky privately expressed reservations similar to those of his socialist opponents on aspects of contemporary Judaism, such as the role of women in Jewish religious life. Jabotinsky argued that Judaism died when the Land was lost two thousand years ago. The geographical isolation of the Jews had been replaced by a religious isolation, which allowed them to survive as a people on the margins. Judaism had not progressed in those two thousand years; the inner meaning of this “religious encasement” had been forgotten:
If the people voluntarily encased their religious consciousness within an iron frame, dried it out to the point of fossilisation, and turned a living religion into something like a mummified corpse of religion—it is clear that the holy treasure is not the religion, but something else, something for which this mummified corpse was supposed to serve as shell and
protection. 41
Significantly, he hardly ever referred to Talmudic sources in his writings. His novel Samson 42 projects a very pagan resonance. He never used the term Malchut Israel, the Kingdom of Israel. Jabotinsky believed that the Jews had both a historical right and an existential need for a state. He distinguished between the heimstatte of the Basle programme of 1897 and Herzl’s Judenstat, which he advocated before many a captivated audience. 43 His views on the boundaries of the state were determined by practical considerations and not by mystical religious ones.
The Revisionists’ aim was the creation of a state with a Hebrew majority on both sides of the Jordan. ]abotinsky’s plan in 1926 to bring 50,000-60,000 Jews to Palestine every year thus required unpopulated areas. The East Bank was almost ideal since it was sparsely populated and Abdullah privately hinted that he was not averse to Jewish settlement. In his testimony to the Royal Commission in 1937, Jabotinsky defined Eretz Yisrael as “a geographic entity” on both sides of the Jordan—-an area which was required to relieve Jewish suffering in Europe, to “save millions, many millions of Jews.” Jabotinsky continually argued in the late 1930s that Trans]ordan was needed to accommodate Jews from the “zones of distress” in Poland and other east European countries. In 1936, Jabotinsky claimed that an area of 70,000 square kilometers, on the East and West banks of
the Jordan, could hold 8.5 million inhabitants based on the population of Germany and some eighteen million based on Belgium. His ten-year plan in 1938 advocated the movement of one million Jews. A few months before his death in 1940, Jabotinsky, in ignorance of the fate about to befall European Jewry, suggested that five million immigrants could be evacuated within ten to fifteen years after the war. The planning for this operation could be carried out during the war in order to present it to the inevitable peace conference.
Yet Ben-Gurion had raised the possibility of a second partition of Palestine at a closed meeting of Mapai. When this was made public, it produced fission lines across most of the major Zionist parties. Some such as Menachem Ussishkin’s General Zionists and Meir Berlin’s Mizrachi were in outright opposition, but it effectively aligned several Zionist groups with the hitherto marginalised Revisionists. 44 The Royal Commission supported the establishment of a Jewish State and the annexation of the remainder of Palestine to TransJordan. 45 The Jewish State would occupy some 5000 km2, a mere ten per cent of the Zionists’ submission to the Versailles conference.
]abotinsky’s followers included Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Avraham Stern, and Ben-Zion Netanyahu; although they were in awe of him, they were also much further to the right than their mentor. They were young, radical, and unable to see shades of grey. They came of political age in the Europe of the 1930s under the influence of étatist regimes such as those of Mussolini, Dolfuss, and Salazar, as well as that of their native Poland. In addition, they keenly observed the gathering of the storm clouds in pre-war Europe and British political immobility, and thus arrived at a doctrine of military struggle rather than what they perceived as aimless diplomacy. Zionism was a movement of national liberation. Their exemplars as freedom fighters were Bar»Kochba, Garibaldi, and the Irish Republican Army. 46 Their political thinking evolved not only due to Jabotinsky, but also to the influence of far right intellectuals such as Abba Achimeir, who admired Mussolini’s Italy and initially expressed an understanding for Hitler’s Nazi revolution of German life; 47 Uri Zvi Greenberg, whose fiery, Zionism; 48 and Yonatan Ratosh, who argued that a Jewish majority was not necessary for a Jewish state. 49 Thus when Jabotinsky hesitated at contemplating the possibility of a second partition in 1937, Betar vehemently and indignantly rejected it. One consequence of such thinking was the use of Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel, to mean two different entities, one situated in traditional Jewish texts, the other a consequence of nationalist Zionist debate in the 1930s.
The clash came in September 1938, at the World Conference of Betar in Warsaw. At the time of the Katowice conference in 1933, Menachem Begin had proposed civil disobedience as a course of action in Palestine. Now he argued the case for military Zionism, much to the public irritation of Jabotinsky.  Military Zionism was the next phase of the Zionist experiment, Begin claimed, in succession to practical Zionism and political Zionism. He suggested that a military force composed of the followers of Betar could enter Palestine without the assistance of any foreign power. Jabotinsky retorted that Begin’s idea was totally impractical and that this was essentially “a noise for noise’s sake.” Although Jabotinsky was respectfully heard out, his political influence over the young radicals waned dramatically. They now tended to carry out independent actions. Significantly, the clash at the conference was not reported in the Revisionist press. 50
When World War II broke out, Jabotinsky immediately gave his own and his movement’s support for the allies.“ Begin and many Betarniks thought differently. Begin did not see the war as a Jewish war and cautiously engaged in discussion to investigate whether British weakness at that time could be exploited. Another follower of Jabotinsky, Avraham Stern, had become severely disillusioned with his mentor and referred to him as “Hindenberg,” yesterday’s
man. 52 Stern broke with Jabotinsky to form his own organisation, known as the Stern Gang by the British. Stern had studied Irish Republican literature and even translated P. S. O’Hegarty’s The Victory of Sinn Fein into Hebrew. 53 Learning the
lesson from Sir Roger Casement’s collaboration with the Germans in World War I, Stern believed that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”54 In his desire to establish a Jewish State, he advocated contact with the Italians and later with the Germans. Stern’s proposal for a volkishnationalen Hebraertum 55 allied to the Reich and his request For 40,000 Jews from occupied Europe were rejected by the German Legation in Beirut. His quotation from one of the Fuhrer’s recent speeches and advocacy of a New Order did not impress. 56 Begin, on the other hand, did not formally abandon Jabotinsky even though he disagreed with him on the crucial issue of military Zionism and an end to the niceties of diplomacy. Begin was both more cautious and shrewd, although similar ideological streams influenced him. Unlike Stern, he believed that the enemy of my enemy was not automatically my friend. Unlike Jabotinsky, he abhorred the British, but he hated the Germans even more. 57  Jabotinsky died suddenly in the United States in 1940, leaving the way open for a reinterpretation of his teachings and a reimaging of his persona. Begin resurrected Jabotinsky as an icon and proclaimed the Revolt in 1944 as head of the Irgun Zvai Leumi. Jabotinsky, who favoured diplomacy, was declared to the be father of the Revolt, whilst Stern, who was the real initiator, was never mentioned. 58
In the late 1940s, therefore, there existed three groups who owed their political pedigree to ]abotinsky’s Revisionist movement: the official Revisionists, the New Zionist Organisation, under Arieh Altman, who swore allegiance to jabotinsky and condemned military Zionism; Menachem Begin’s Irgun Zvai Leumi, which proclaimed Jabotinsky as their sage and inspiration; and Avraham Stern’s lrgun B’Yisrael, later Lehi, which considered themselves post-Jabotinskyian. 59 There was profound disagreement among these factions. Indeed, recently released CID files show that the Official Revisionists were condemning Lehi in their press and actually talking to British intelligence. 60
Lehi had exalted the idea of individual terror, hisul [elimination]; the assassination of Lord Moyne, for example. Although the servants of the Mandate were the principal targets, 61 Lehi members were not averse to killing Revisionist opponents as well as former members of their own organisation. When Lehi reformed after Stern’s killing by the British, Yitzhak Yezernitsky—Shamir became head of military operations. Shamir’s nom dc guerre was “Mikhail” after Michael Collins, the progenitor of the IRA. Indeed, all three military organisations, the Haganah, 62 the Irgun, and Lehi, carried out killings of their ideological opponents, but Lehi, the smallest group, carried out 71% of all political assassinations between 1940 and 1948—and 48% of those killed by Lehi were fellow Jews. 63
What was the attitude of these Revisionist factions to the borders of the  proposed state? Both the Official Revisionists and the Irgun maintained the old Jabotinskyian approach: “There are two banks—this one is ours and so is the other.” When Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann accepted the second partition of Mandatory Palestine in 1947 into Jewish and Palestinian states, Begin vehemently opposed ‘it, referring to the “statelet” of Israel. On May 15, 1948, Begin emerged from the underground and broadcast his Famous message on the Irgun radio; Begin bitterly attacked the decision to agree to a Jewish state and an Arab state. This partition was “a crime, a blasphemy, an abortion.” He told his audience:
Whoever does not recognise as natural our entire homeland, does not recognise our right to any part of it. The soldiers of Israel will yet unfurl our flag over David’s Tower and our ploughshares will yet cleave the fields of Gilead.
David’s Tower was then situated in Arab Jerusalem, while the fields of Gilead were on the East Bank of the Jordan, an integral part of Abdullah’s territory. Begin continued:
We shall continue to bear the vision of full independence. And we shall bring it about. For it is an iron rule of life: that which comes between the people’s state and the homeland must disappear. The state will cover the homeland. The homeland will be the state. 64
Although Begin coloured his statements with a greater preponderance of traditional imagery than did Jabotinsky, he differed profoundly from Stern. Stern’s romanticism and religiosity coloured his politics. He was influenced by messianism and in particular by Maimonides’ understanding of messianic redemption. 65 Stern’s Eighteen Principles of National Revival quoted Genesis on the borders of Israel and advocated the building of the Third Temple in Jerusalem. The third clause stated:
The Land of Israel was conquered by the Jews by the sword. It was here they became a nation and only here can they be reborn. Not only has Israel the right to ownership over the land but this ownership is absolute and has never nor can never be rescinded. 66
The absolutism of Stern was quietly diluted by his successors in Lehi, the triumvirate of Israel Eldad, Yitzhak Shamir, and Natan Yellin-Mor. After World  War II, Lehi moved to a more pro-Soviet position on the same basis of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” that had led to proposed cooperation with the Poles, the Italians, and the Germans. This in turn led to a suggested alignment with anti-imperialist Arab movements. By 1947, Lehi was advocating “the two sides of the Jordan” approach rather than “from the Nile to the Euphrates”-more Jabotinsky than Stern. 67
All three Revisionist groups stood in the first elections. Herut, Begin’s successor movement to the Irgun, achieved a total of 14 seats; the Fighters’ Party, the successor to Lehi, one seat; and the Official Revisionists were totally wiped off the political map. In his struggle to rewrite history and proclaim himself Jabotinsky’s legitimate ideological heir, Begin had won the political battle.
In the first Knesset, Begin preached the legitimacy of borders on both sides of the Jordan. He attacked Abdullah for annexing the West Bank and Ben-Gurion for his apparent acquiescence in it:
You have acknowledged the legitimacy of handing over Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, the Cave of Machpela, Rachel’s tomb, Hebron, Bethlehem, Shechem, Gilead, and Bashan to a foreigner, an enemy, an oppressor. Who gave you the right? 68
Begin referred to Jordan as “that vassal state that exists on our homeland” and in a biblical analogy labelled Abdullah as “the Ammonite slave.” 69 He pleaded with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett not to acquiesce in the fact that “AIlah’s slave will rule eighty percent of our homeland.” He even argued that the construction of the Jewish State could not begin “until our country is cleansed of invading armies.”70
By the mid-1950s, the glory days of the Irgun and the demand to conquer the East Bank had begun to recede before the realities of governing and managing a modern state. Thus, in the Herut manifesto for the 1959 election, the programme
proclaimed merely that “the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel in its historic entirety is an eternal and inalienable right.”71 Another reason for downplaying the territorial issue was Begin’s courting of the General Zionists. He understood that he would never form a government based on Herut alone. A broad anti-Mapai coalition had to be forged. 72 This proved difficult since the sedate bourgeois demeanour of the general Zionists contrasted dramatically with Begin’s “blood
and fire” rhetoric. Begin thus began the transformation from ostracised radical to founding father. Although as late as 1958 Begin was still referring to shlemut ha’aretz, “the historic completeness of Eretz Israel,”73 a few years later he pushed
through Herut’s entry into the Histadrut. 74 This process continued apace into the 1960s to the point that Begin was able to form a coalition with the General Zionists, now the Liberals, and together they fought the 1965 election as Gahal. Their manifesto Watered down Herut’s territorial demands; Begin hardly ever mentioned the East Bank. Indeed, he could even participate in discussions with Ben Gurion’s Rafi, a breakaway from Mapai, in early 1967, in the hope of broadening his right-wing coalition. 75
The Six Day War, however, changed all political calculations. The conquest of the West Bank once again raised the issue of the borders of the state for all political parties. Groups such as the Land of Israel Movement allowed formerly bitter enemies, left and right, secular and religious, to sit together in agreeing that the fruits of the 1967 victory should be retained. In ideological terms, it allowed Begin to reassert claims to the Territories and to move his coalition partners closer towards his ideological stand. He was also able to benefit from splits in the Labour Party over the territorial question such that, together with Ben-Gurion’s State List, he was able to establish the Likud in 1973. The status quo of Israeli control of the Territories now favoured his stand, and there was widespread public nervousness at changing this situation, which could have severe ramifications.
In 1977, through a clever process of coalition building, disarray, further fragmentation and corruption in Labour’s ranks, and just sheer good luck, Begin became Prime Minister at the age of 64 in his ninth attempt. Along the way he broadened his narrow appeal by uniting maximalists from other parties, including Labour, such as Ezer Weizmann, Arik Sharon, and Moshe Dayan. 76 The Likud election manifesto of 1977 stated:
The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal, and is an integral part of its right to security and peace. Judea and Samaria shall therefore not be relinquished to foreign rule; between the sea and the Jordan, there will be Jewish sovereignty alone. Any plan that involves surrendering parts of western Eretz Israel militates against our right to
the Land, would inevitably lead to the establishment of a “Palestinian State,” threaten the security of the civilian population, endanger the existence of the State of Israel, and defeat all prospects of peace. 77
Yet once in power, Begin displayed a pragmatism closer in spirit to Jabotinsky than to his radical right mentors. The Camp David agreement effectively dismantled the grand coalition of the Right, which he had painstakingly assembled since 1948. 78
Whereas 75°/o of the Likud voted for the Camp David framework, only 57% of his Herut party did so. 79 This eventually led to political fragmentation and the establishment of Techiya and other far-right movements. Many of his right-wing opponents, and especially the settlers, believed that Begin had compromised on the West Bank.80 In fact, he had outmanoeuvred U.S. President jimmy Carter, who wished to stop settlement activity. As Carter later remarked, “Begin’s good
words had multiple meanings which my advisers and I did not understand at the time.” 81
And yet the price that Begin was willing to pay for a bilateral treaty with Egypt was the return of Sinai. Indeed, it could he argued from a religious perspective that the Sinai was the cradle of Jewish civilisation, since the Torah was given there. Begin pragmatically seemed to turn his back on that and accepted a proposal close to that of the original Versailles proposal of 1919; i.e., that a  probable border would be along the El Arish-Akaba line, but this would be negotiable.
Yitzhak Shamir, Begin’s successor, came from a different ideological background. His leadership of Lehi suggested that he was post-Revisionist and did not have the same reverence forjabotinsky as did his predecessor. Indeed, he had rejected reunification with Begin’s Irgun in 1944. If Begin reinterpreted Jabotinsky, Shamir rejected him. Unlike his mentors Abba Achimeir and Uri Zvi Greenberg, Shamir did not join I-Ierut in 1948. In fact, he joined only in 1970, embracing the doctrine of Jabotinsky worship once more after 28 years in an anti-Revisionist wilderness. Shamir’s change of direction was probably obviated by the fact that Herut was no longer on the political margins, but remained the only non-religious party that had not abandoned the concept of a greater Israel.
Unlike Begin, Shamir was uninspiring, unemotional, and, for the religious, somewhat less than traditional, yet he was profoundly doctrinaire when it came to expounding the borders of the state. He had opposed the Camp David framework and, as both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, essentially stonewalled any proposal that might affect Jewish settlement or advance the rival claims of Palestinian nationalism. In his last government, Moshe Arens, then Minister of Defence, proposed that a solution be found to the problem of Gaza, especially in the light of the rise of Islamic militancy. Shamir replied, “Gaza is part of the Land of Israel. ”82 Shamir also vehemently opposed the Hebron agreement of 1997 and criticised Benjamin Netanyahu in the process. 83 Yet, as with Begin, the far Right acted dramatically if there was any possibility of territorial compromise, such as at the Madrid Conference in 1991. 84 It can be argued that both Begin and Shamir were brought down by an unthinking Right, which understood little of the subtlety of their negotiating tactics.
And where does N etanyahu stand on the question of the borders of Israel? He is, of course, a scion of the “fighting family.” His father was an avid disciple of Jabotinsky and an admirer of Abba Achimeir. 85 He has subsumed this publicly divisive issue within an overriding concern for security and an emphasis on combating terrorism. Yet Labour’s rapprochement with the Palestinians and Yassir Arafat’s return have posed a new reality for Netanyahu. Are the old Revisionist territorial claims viable or, indeed, rational in this new situation? In the 1996 election there were no overt ideological references tojudea and Samaria. Indeed, Netanyahu hinted that “we cannot always fulfil our dreams.”86 Netanyahu was present at the ceremony in the Arava in 1994 when a peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan.” No one from the Likud claimed the East Bank was part of Eretz Israel. There was an unspoken recognition that there was a difference between the dream and the reality. But at which point would this revisionism of Revisionism cease? Would it be possible to accept the return of the West Bank or even part of it at some point as well?
During the 1996 election, Netanyahu distinguished between accepting the reality of the facts created by the Oslo Accord and accepting the Accord itself. 88 This distinction permitted adherence to the dream of Eretz Israel and to the reality of dealing with the PLO. On one level it could be seen as permitting a partition of the West Bank into areas of Jewish settlement territorially bound to Israel and areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. The determining factor of the acceleration of Jewish settlement on the West Bank suggests that the separation into two distinct sovereign areas will become
increasingly unlikely. Like his Likud predecessors, Netanyahu prevaricated and stonewalled when necessary, such that negotiations often became a meaningless exercise. His strategy was to expand already existing settlements while attempting
to isolate the Palestinians in enclaves. Despite the Hebron Agreement of 1997, Netanyahu’s strategy remains traditionally similar to that of his predecessors, even if his tactics are exceedingly different and certainly more sophisticated.
Unlike his predecessor Yitzhak Shamir, Netanyahu does not believe that Israel should or could hold the West Bank in its entirety. Even so, if the West Bank is to be partitioned, then he clearly intends to defer this as long as possible and, in the final analysis, to place as much of the area as possible under Israeli control.
In May 1999, Netanyahu was defeated by Ehucl Barak in both the elections for Prime Minister and the party election for the Knesset. Barak’s victory in the premiership contest — by a margin of 56.08% to Netanyahu’s 43.92% — was certainly overwhelming by Israeli standards (compared to Netanyahu’s defeat of Shimon Peres by a mere 30,000 votes in 1996).
Likud’s 19 mandates (14.1% of the vote) was an all-time low for the party. The rise of the Sephardi party, Shas, close behind—with 17 mandates — symbolised the mass desertion of the Sephardim for their own ethnic party. Although Netanyahu’s last months were characterised by a rash of attempts to establish new settlements, this did not endear him to the far Right, which formed several new groupings under the leadership of Benny Begin. Similarly, a number of senior figures in the Likud left to form a new centre party, some out of personal antagonism to Netanyahu. This move was indicative of Netanyahu’s
fundamental problem, in that he now had to face both towards the Right and to the Centre in order to win the election.
The double vote catalysed the fragmentation of the party vote such that only 20.2% of the electorate voted For the winning party, Barak’s “One Israel.” Netanyahu stepped down somewhat ignominiously from both the Likud leadership and seemingly from political life as well and was replaced by Arik  Sharon, now over seventy years old, who was seen in a caretaker role.
Although both the Palestinian and Syrian tracks encountered great difficulties in terms of progress, the Barak government appeared to establish a climate of trust, which had been absent during the Netanyahu years, since it did not have to drag the ideological and emotional baggage of the Likud and its forbears with it into the negotiating process. Against this, Barak included several parties within his administration which were ideologically closer to the Likud, such as the National Religious Party.
1. The British often designated the Jewish homeland as “E. I,” Eretz Yisrael. This added to the confusion and obscured fundamental ideological differences between the modern Zionist experiment and orthodoxy’s understanding of the term, “the Land of Israel.” There were several ultra-orthodox objections to human intervention in setting in motion a messianic series of events; “Forcing the end” was condemned. For an excellent exposition of ultra-orthodoxy’s ideological opposition to Zionism, see Aviezer Rativsky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish, Religious Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
2. Gen 15:18-21.
3. Num 34:1-4.
4. Deut 1:7-8.
5. Josh 1:4.
6. Judg 1;21-35.
7. Ezek 47:13-20.
8. Gideon Biger, “The Names and Boundaries of Eretz Israel as Reflections of States in its
History,” in The Land That Became Israel (ed. R. Kark; New Haven and London, 1990), 12- 14.
9. 1 Sam 24:2, 1 Kgs 5:5.
10. In 1 Sam 13:29, when King Saul reigned.

11. Gen 40:15.
12. Josh 11:22.
13. M. Git. 1, 2.
14. Ibid
15. Josh 18:27.
16. Tosafot [additions] are commentaries on the Talmud by medieval scholars. Note 9 on B. Git 2a in Tractate Gittin, vol. 1, in the Schottenstein edition of the Babylonian Talmud (ed. Rabbi Y. S. Schorr; Brooklyn: Masorah, I995).
17. Num 34:1-4.
18. Gen 15:18-21.

19. N0te 2 on B. Git. 8a in Tractate Gittin, vol. 1, in the Soncino edition of the Babylonian Talmud (ed. Rabbi I. Epstein; London: Soncino, 1963). Saadia Gaon (882-942) was perhaps the greatest Jewish scholar of his age and an important leader of Babylonian Jewry. His was the first translation of the Hebrew Bible into Arabic.
20. 1 Chr 13:5.
21. Richard S. Sarason, “The Significance of the Land of Israel in the Mishnah,” in The
Land’ of Israel: Jewish Perspectives (ed. L. Hoffman; Bloomington, 1995), 109-36.
22. As quoted in Colin Shindler, Israel, Likud, and the Zionist Dream: Power, Politics, and
Ideology from Berlin to Netanyahu (London, 1995), 223.
23. The Balfour Declaration states that: “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Chaim Weizmann effectively secured this international declaration, which Theodor Herzl had sought nearly twenty years before. The wording of the declaration could be interpreted in a number of different ways, and of course it did not specifically mention “a Jewish state.”
The Balfour Declaration was made in November 1917, at a time when Britain was taking control of Palestine. A year later, Germany had collapsed and a peace conference was in sight. It was as this point that the first Zionist map was formulated. See Jehuda Reinharz, “The Balfour Declaration in Historical Perspective,” in Essential Papers in Zionism (ed. ]. Reinharz and A. Shapira; New York: New York University Press, 1996), 587-61 1.
24. ltzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (New York, 1995), 36-40.
25. Arnon Sofer, “Ha’azspekt ha’geographi, ha’histori v’ha’politi medinat yisrael v’aretz yisrael,” in Medinat Yisrael V’Aretz Yisrael (ed. A. Doron; Tel Aviv, 1988), 6.
26. On 1 January, 1921, responsibility for the mandated territories was transferred to the Colonial Office, whose Minister was Winston Churchill. At Cairo in March, Churchill’s offer to Abdullah resolved the distribution of political influence between the British and the French and placated the Hashemites. The price paid by the powerless Zionists was effectively the loss of the East Bank, which became the modern state of Jordan. This arrangement was formalised in September 1922. See Jehuda Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann, The Making of a Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 520-61.
27. Vladimir jabotinsky was born in Odessa in 1880. As early as his teenage years, he was acclaimed as a fine journalist with a tremendous future. The Kishinev pogrom in 1903 catalysed an awakening of his Jewish consciousness and a commitment to the Zionist movement. A brilliant speaker and polemicist, he looked towards the national independence struggles of both Italy under Garibaldi and Poland under Pilsudski as the examples to imitate. This led him to work for the existence of a Jewish military force, abrogating the idea of Zionist neutrality and thereby taking sides during World War I.

28. Jabotinsky felt that Herzl’s legacy of dynamic activism had fallen by the wayside. Zionism had ossified under a policy of unimaginative diplomacy, and Jewish youth were unmoved by the idea of a Future Jewish state. Jabotinsky wanted a more vigorous approach towards the British, military training for young Jews, a robust stand against Arab attacks, and a maximalist territorial approach. He also moved from a non-Communist position to an anti-Communist one as a result of his growing distaste for the Bolsheviks.
29. Betar was the abbreviation for Brit Trumpldor, the covenant of (Iosef) Trumpeldor, who together with Jabotinsky pioneered the idea of a Jewish fighting force during World War I and saw action at Gallipoli. He was killed at Tel Chai by Arab assailants; his last words were allegedly, “It is good to die For one’s country.” Jabotinsky eventually became Rosh Betar [head of Betar] and inspired a remarkable loyalty amongst his young acolytes, who included Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. The Revisionist Movement was founded in 1925 by Jabotinsky. This merged with Menachem Begin’s Herut movement after the first Knesset elections in 1949. Herut in turn merged with the Liberals in 1965 and with the remnants of Ben-Gurion’s State List to form the Likud in 1973.
30. Jabotinsky left Russia in the summer of 1915, as a journalist for Russkaya Vyedomosti, to cover the Western Front. Much of his time was spent persuading the British to permit the establishment of a Jewish fighting force. After great opposition within Zionist circles, “a Jewish Regiment of Infantry,” with the shield of David as its badge, was formally instituted in August 1917. This Jewish Legion served on the Palestinian from in 1918 and eventually consisted of 4,500 men in three battalions. See Jabotinsky’s The Story of the Jewish Legion, which was first published in 1928.
31. I.e., the time leading up to the establishment of a Jewish state.
32. Lev 19:19, Deut 22:11. “Sha’atnez” was understood as cloth made from a mixture of two materials, which is clarified in Deuteronomy as wool and linen.
33. Vladimir Jabotinsky, “Sha’atnez lo ya’ale alekha” (Hadar, 1940). “Sha’atnez lo ya’ale alekha” was the original title of a 1929 article in Hebrew by Jabotinsky, in which he expounded his belief that there should not be any mixing of ideologies; i.e., Zionism and Socialism. It is taken from Lev 19:19 and pronounces the prohibition on wearing a
garment “where two materials are mixed together” (see also above).
34. Ahad I-la’am was born Asher Ginsburg in 1856; he signed his articles Ahad Ha’am (“one of the people”). Through his philosophical writings, he influenced a generation of Zionist leaders, including Chaim Weizmann and Chaim Nachman Bialik, the Hebrew national poet. He opposed Herzl’s perception of Zionism, which saw the movement as simply a means of solving the question of antisemitism. Ahad Ha’am, unlike Herzl, emerged from the (orthodox) yeshiva rather than assimilationism. His lifelong aim was to create a synthesis of judaisrn and modernity which manifested itself in Zionism. He viewed Zionism as a spiritual centre for Jewry and was one of very few early Zionists who understood the evolving national demands of the Palestinian Arabs.
Martin Buber was as well-known religious philosopher who also worked for Arab-Jewish rapprochement and understanding through such organisations as Brit Shalom in the 1920s and 1930s. Together with Judah Magnes, he proposed a bi-national state. Such views irritated the maximalist Jabotinsky.
35. Jabotinsky, “Sha’atnez lo ya ’ale alekha.”
36. For example, Begin proposed a policy of military Zionism to oppose British rule and to strike back at Arab attacks. Jabotinsky opposed this development, but was unable to retard it. Betar worked with Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Fighting Organization) towards this goal. At the end of 1943, Begin, who had escaped from Poland via the Soviet Union and finally reached Palestine, was appointed commander of the Irgun. ln early 1944, he proclaimed “The Revolt” against the British (see below for Further details).
37. Anthem of Betar: “From a pile of rot and dust/with blood and sweat/will arise a
generation/ proud and generous and strong/whether servant or wanderer/you were created
a prince/crowned with the crown of David/in light and darkness/remember the crown.”
38. Jabotinsky, “Sha’atnez lo ya’ale alekha. ”
39. In the early 1930s, Jabotinsky wished to break away from the World Zionist Organisation and form a parallel umbrella grouping. There was considerable opposition within the Revisionist movement to this move, as many considered that the Zionist movement was too Fragile to experience a schism. Whilst Betar enthusiastically followed Jabotinsky, some of his closest colleagues, such as Meir Grossman, would not and formed the Jewish State Party, which remained within the Zionist organisation.
40. The Labour Zionist movement and the Left in general viewed Jabotinsky, Betar, and the Revisionists as belonging to the same authoritarian political stable as the inter-war European Right. One epithet aimed at Jabotinsky was “Vladimir Hitler,” and the brownshirts of Betar projected a provocative imagery. The Revisionists were held responsible for the assassination of Chaim Arlosoroff, one the of ‘the leaders of Labour Zionism, although no charges were proved in court. On the other hand, Socialist Zionists were seen by the Revisionists as crypto-Communists and admirers of the Soviet Union, instruments of collectivism and illiberalism. Jabotinsky preached that to mix ideologies such as socialism and Zionism was a distraction from the single-minded effort needed to secure a Jewish state. ‘
41. Vladimir Jabotinsky, Zionism and the Land of Israel (1905), quoted in Raphaella Bilski Ben-Hur, Every Individual a King: The Social and Political Thought of Ze ’cv Vladimir  Jabotinsky (Washington, 1993), 123-24. For a selection on ]abotinsky’s views on religion, see M. Sarig, ed., The Political and Social Philosophy of Ze ’ev Jabotinsky (London, 1999), 55-66.
42. Vladimir Jabotinsky, Samson (Warsaw, 1934).
43. Jabotinsky always distinguished between a “national home” [Heimstatte] and a “Jewish state” [Judenstat]. This was a pivotal difference between his approach and that of Weizmann. The latter was highly cautious about any mention of a state because of British back-tracking after the Balfour Declaration. Jabotinsky, however, never lost an opportunity to speak about the establishment of a Jewish state and a Jewish majority in Palestine.

44. Meir Berlin, later Bar-Ilan, and Mizrachi were religious Zionists and therefore believed—within the realm of possibility—-in a Jewish state within biblical boundaries. This automatically aligned them with Jabotinsky and the Revisionists, who were similarly against partition and projected a maximalist approach, but from a different ideological perspective.
45. In 1937, the Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, recommended partition into Jewish and Arab states plus an area to remain under British Mandate control. This was opposed by the British Foreign Qffice, and the proposals were effectively shelved by the report of the Woodhead Commission in 1938. Even so, the very idea of partition created great division within the Zionist world.
46. The Bar Kochba revolt against the Romans, 132-135 CE, was a tragic failure, which some rabbis of the Mishnaic period condemned for its glorious futility. However, Bar Kochba and his rebellion became romantically iconic in early Zionist culture, sprouting Bar Kochba clubs among Jewish students.
Jabotinsky studied in Italy during his teenage years and regarded the country as his spiritual home. He was particularly impressed by the Italian national renaissance and revolt, the Risorgimento, and the figure of its warrior leader, Garibaldi, as opposed to its diplomatic Cavour. “To die or conquer the mountain” was a slogan applicable to both the Italian revolt and the Revisionist aims.
The Irish Republican struggle was the one nearest in time for the Revisionists to study and ponder since it was waged against the same enemy, the British. It certainly influenced the Irgun and Lehi (Stern group) in their military campaign against the British in the 1940s
47. Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics: and Terror (London, 1995).
48. Uri Zvi Greenberg, Book of Indictment and Faith (]erusalem, 1937).
49. Yonatan Ratosh, Our Eyes Are Directed Towards Domination (Tel Aviv, 1937).
50. The report of the conference did not appear in organs of the Revisionist press, such as the Hebrew language Hamashkif or in Diaspora publications, such as the South African Jewish Herald.
51. Vladimir Jabotinsky, The Jewish War Front Jerusalem, 1941).
52. Stern regarded Jabotinsky as a fallen idol, a man with feet of clay who refused to sanction military action. The epithet “Hindenberg”—the man who acquiesced in the appointment of Hitler and was subsequently replaced by him—was applied to Jabotinsky as someone who was tired, weak, and unable to find the inner strength to stand up to the challenges of the hour.
53. P. S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924). The Hebrew version was not formally published, but was used within the Stern group.
54. Stern and the Revisionist camp in general looked to other nations who had liberated themselves through collusion with their “enemy’s enemy.” Thus, the Pole Pilsudski was. in contact with the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-5 as a means of striking at the Tsarist empire. Similarly, Sir Roger Casement tried to solicit assistance from imperial Germany during World War I as a means of overthrowing British control of Ireland.
55. This expression may be translated as “racial national ‘Hebrewness”
56. Stern saw the Germans as persecutors, as the latest link in the long chain of persecutors of the Jews down the centuries. Despite this, he argued, a Jewish uprising against their British enemy would be in their interests. The Germans, however, were exterminators not persecutors. They believed in idealpolitik rather than realpolitik. Thus they rejected Stern ’s approaches.
57. Begin was forced to flee from \X/arsaw following the Polish invasion on 1 September, 1939. He was witness to the first act of World War II and to the barbarism of the Nazis. Although he opposed the British For their control of Palestine and increasingly pro-Arab policies, this did not in any way compare with the bestialities of Nazism.
58. Following the killing of Avraham Stern at the beginning of 1942, the Stern Group was resurrected in 1943 as Lehi (Fighters For the Freedom of Israel). Lehi was seen as a rival to the Irgun Zvai Leumi For the loyalty of the nationalists, although Begin attempted to persuade Lehi to join his own organisation. Stern was the first to plan an uprising against the British in 1940, but could not be mentioned because of differences with Lehi. On the other hand, Jabotinsky ironically did
not want an uprising, but was iconically described as the father of the Revolt.
59. Unlike Begin, Stern and his Followers no longer regarded themselves as disciples of Jabotinsky. Their world outlook incorporated many other influences.
60. Ha’aretz, 22 January, 1998. Recently opened CID (the Criminal Investigation Department, an intelligence operation of the British police force) files from 1941 show that Altman was talking to the British authorities about the Irgun and Lehi.
61. The Mandate for Palestine was given to Britain after World War I, and the responsible authorities employed Britons, Jews, and Arabs in order to institute good governance of the area. Some Jews were employed as policemen and in the intelligence services – which both the Irgun and Lehi viewed as traitorous.
62. The Haganah was instituted as the defence Force of the Yishuv [Jewish settlement in Palestine] in 1920. It ceased to exist when the Israel Defense Force came into existence on 31 May, 1948.
63. Shindler, Israel, Likud, and the Zionist Dream, 176.
64. Menachem Begin, “Address on Irgun Radio,” 15 May, 1948.
65. Maimonides rationalised the idea of a messiah and stripped it of supernaturalism. A descendant of the royal House of David, the messiah would be an earthly king who would return Jews to Eretz Yisrael, bringing about international peace and the full observance of God’s commandments.
66. Shindler, Israel, Likud, and the Zionist Dream, 176.
67. Lehi submission to the UN General Assembly, September 1947.
68. Menachem Begin speech in the Knesset, 3 May, 1950, in Major Knesset Debates, vol. 3 (ed. N. Lorch; London: 1992), 395.
69. See 2 Sam 12:31.

70. Menachem Begin speech in the Knesset, 8 March, 1950, in Major Knesset Debates, 395.
71. Programme for a National Liberal Government headed by Tenuat Ha ’Herut, 1959.
72. Mapai, the Israel Workers’ Parry, was formed in 1930. It supplied many of the early leaders of the state of Israel, such as David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Golda Meir. It was the precursor of the Israel Labour Party.
73. Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference of Herut, 1958.
74. The Histadrut, the General Federation of Labour, was founded in 1920. It performs the functions of both employer and trade union. Its first secretary-general was David Ben- Gurion.
75. Shindler, Israel Likud, and the Zionist Dream, 70.
76. Maximalists were generally those who wished to retain territory conquered by Israel during the Six Day War in 1967.
77. Foreign and Defense Polity and the Effort to Assure True Peace, Likud Platform for the Ninth Knesset, 1977.
78. Begin forged an alliance between his own party, Herut, and the Liberals in 1965. ‘With disaffected remnants of the Labour Party, he formed the Likud in 1973. On coming to power, he was able to attract Moshe Dayan, who left the Labour Party, and to work closely with the religious parties, the far Right, and the Sephardim. Ideological differences within this grand coalition became apparent with the signing of the Camp David agreement (see below).
79. Shindler, Israel, Likud, and the Zionist Dream, 98.
80. Begin’s promise to return Sinai to the Egyptians persuaded many of his opponents within the Likud and on the far Right that he was also going to return the West Bank. Such suspicions proved unfounded.
81. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (London, 1982), 300.
82. Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant (New York, 1995), 210.
83. In January 1977, Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to redeploy Israeli troops in Hebron on the West Bank such that Israel essentially controlled only the Jewish settlement in the city.
84. The Madrid Peace Conference was held at the end of October 1991 , under the auspices of the superpowers. It constituted a public meeting point for Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab states. It provided for the establishment of several bilateral commissions, one of which produced an eventual lsraeli-Jordanian accord. Superseded by the secret Oslo talks with the Palestinians, it was also marked by a total lack of progress in discussions with the Syrians.
85. Abba Achimeir was one of the intellectual leaders of the far Right in the Yishuv. He evinced great sympathy for Muss0lini’s Italy and was seen at one time as a rival to Jabotinsky to lead the nationalist camp.
86. Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World (London, 1993), 373-76.

87. A peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed at the end of October 1994, in
which the problems of security, mutual recognition, border delineation, and distribution
of water resources were finally resolved.
88. Ha’aretz, 22 April, 1996. During the 1996 campaign, Netanyahu attempted to win the centre ground while still maintaining the adherence of the right. He thereby stopped implying that he would reverse the Qslo Accords, but instead distinguished between theory and practice, between history and the present. He still condemned the accord itself, but accepted the reality of negotiating with the PLO.

‘A Land Flowing with Milk and Honey,’ Studies in Jewish Civilisation ed. Leonard J. Greenspoon and Ronald A. Simkins

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